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be a matter of fact to be submitted to the jury for its determination."
In this form the bill says nothing about being*able to stop within the
assured clear distance ahead. Although the intent of the author of the
bill seems to be plain to one who knows the history of the statute, it may
be questioned whether, for the sake of clarity, he should not have in-
cluded another sentence.
D. M. POSTLEWAITE.
Bankruptcy
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER BY INSOLVENT DEBTOR-RIGHTS OF
CREDITORS TO SUE AFTER ADJUDICATION OF BANKRUPTCY
AND APPOINTMENT OF A TRUSTEE
In Winter's National Bank and Trust Company v. Midland A4c-
ceptance Corporation, 47 Ohio App. 324, 191 N.E. 889 (934, pre-
viously annotated on another point, "Chattel Mortgages and the Bulk
Sales Act," 7 Ohio Bar May 6, 1935), a creditor brought his action
to set aside a conveyance alleged to be in violation of the Bulk Sales
Act, Section I 102, General Code, after the adjudication in bankruptcy
and the appointment of the trustee. The latter, on the following day,
filed his intervening petition. In their opinion the court said, "The right
to institute the action which the plaintiff (creditor) sought to prosecute
was, by the adjudication of Gessaman, the bankrupt, and the appoint-
ment of a trustee, vested in the representative of all of Gessaman's credi-
tors, the trustee," and so dismissed the plaintiff's suit.
This raises the problem of under what circumstances a creditor may
sue to set aside allegedly fraudulent transfers by an insolvent debtor.
When a creditor sues prior to bankruptcy to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance, his right is not interfered with by the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy and the subsequent appointment of a trustee unless the latter
intervenes. Walker v. Connell, 54 Sup. Ct. 251, 24 Am. B.R. (n.s.)
229 (1934). A similar result would seem to follow when the creditor
sues subsequent to bankruptcy but prior to the apopintment of the trustee.
Frost v. Latham, 181 Fed. 866 (191o). And where a trustee was not
appointed after a debtor had been adjudicated a bankrupt, a creditor has
been permitted to sue in his own name. Guarantee Title and Trust Co.
v. Pearlman, 144 Fed. 550, i6 Am. B.R. 461 (i9o6). However, the
trustee, after he is appointed, may intervene and collect the assets for
the benefit of the estate. Matter of Vadner, 42 Am. B.R. 465 (1918) ;
In Re Rogers, 125 Fed. 169, x1 Am. B.R. 79 (1903). After the
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intervention of the trustee, a creditor, through the operation of section
64b [ii U.S.C.A. IO4b] of the bankruptcy act, is reimbursed for his
reasonable services. Frost v. Latham, supra.
After an adjudication in bankruptcy and the appointment of a trus-
tee, the general rule as stated in the Midland Case, supra, gives the right
to bring suit to the trustee, to the exclusion of the creditor. Glenny v.
Langdon, 98 U.S. 20, 25 L. Ed. 43 (1878); Remington, Section
2222; Colliers (1 3 th edition) page 1777. Where the trustee refused
to bring suit, one court has permitted a creditor to sue in the trustee's
name. Exchange National Bank of Montgomery v. Stewart, i58 Ala.
396, 48 S. 487 (1909). Another has permitted him to sue in his own
name. Googins v. Skilling, io8 At. 50, 44 Am. B. R. 378 (919);
Matter of Vadner, supra. Or to make the trustee a party defendant,
Casey v. Baker, 212 Fed. 247, 32 Am. B.R. 311 (1914). And see
Dictum in In re Schenk, n16 Fed. 554-6, 8 Am. B.R. 727, 729
(1902).
The thory upon which the Midland Case rests is the supersedence
by the National Bankruptcy Act of the rights given to creditors by the
State law. Under the National Act, the property and powers of the
bankrupt as set out in Section 7oa [II U.S.C.A. i ioa] and the "rights,
remedies, and powers" of creditors, as mentioned in Section 47a-2 [I I
U.S.C.A. 75a-2] are vested in the trustee. See comment "Suits by
Bankrupts on Pre-Bankruptcy Claims," 7 OHIO BAR 731 (March
25, 1935). Similarly Sections 6ob and 67 (c), (e), and (f), [ii
U.S.C.A. 9 6b, 107 (c), (e), (f)] confer direct powers on a trustee
to set aside voidable preferences and liens. But under Section 7oe [II
U.S.C.A. ioe], and see Section 67b [ii U.S.C.A. Io 7b], the trus-
tee's right is derived by subrogation from the rights of the creditors as
created by State law. In Re Gray, 47 N.Y. App. Div. 554, 3 Am.
B.R. 647 (1900)- See 32 Mich. Law Review 369 for power of trus-
tee to sell or assign these rights.
The cases referred to above show that the appointment of a trustee
in bankrupcy does not necessarily divest a creditor of his rights to sue.
However, the authority is overwhelming that in ordinary situations, after
appointment of a trustee, a creditor may no longer sue upon a claim
which vests in a trustee under Section 7oe of the Bankruptcy Act.
Ruhl-Koblegard v. Gillespie, 56 S.E. 898, 22 Am. B.R. 643 (907);
MacMahon v. Pithian, i66 Iowa 498, 147 N.W. 920 (914); Chat-
field v. O'Dwyer, ioi Fed. 797, 4 Am. B.R. 313 (19oo); In Re
Kohler, 2o Am. B.R. 89 (19o8). This is not based upon the wording
of the Act, but upon a desire to prevent creditors from obtaining more
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than their proportionate share of a bankrupt's estate, and to encourage
the creditors to inform the trustee of voidable transfers. Trimble v.
Woodhead, 102 U.S. 647, 26 L. Ed. 290 (188o).
It would seem, therefore, that the rule as stated in the Midland
Case was correctly applied upon its facts though the rule, itself, is not
as absolute as intimated by the court in their opinion.
HARRY A. GOLDMAN.
Chattel Mortgages
BULK SALES ACT-CrHATTEL MORTGAGE ACT- LIEN AND
TITLE THEORY - FRAUD
The recent case of Winter's National Bank and Trust Co. v. Mid-
land Acceptance Corporation, 47 Ohio App. 324, 17 Abs. 146, 40
O.L.R. 3o8, 191 N.E. 889 0934)
, 
raises the problem of whether
the Bulk Sales Act, Section iio2 of the General Code, applies to a
chattel mortgage, a question of first impression in Ohio. One F. H.
Gessaman had executed and delivered to the defendant, one of several
creditors, a chattel mortgage which covered the entire equipment of his
new and used auto sales establishment. The consideration was deferring
legal action on a note of $15,OOO, the note being due and unpaid as to
principal and interest. Plaintiff bank, as a creditor of Gessaman, sought
to subject certain chattel property to a trust in the hands of the defend-
ant, upon the claim that the defendant took the property by sale or
transfer from Gessaman in violaion of the provisions of Section I 1102,
et seq., General Code. The statute provides in substance that the sale,
transfer or assignment, in bulk of any part or the whole of a stock of
merchandise, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade of the
seller, transferer or assignor, shall be void as against his creditors, unless
the purchaser, transferee, or assignee, demands and receives from the
seller, transferrer or assignor, a certified list of names of his creditors,
with the amount of indebtedness owing to each, and gives certain speci-
fied notice to them five days before taking possession.
The jurisdictions which have been confronted by this problem have
split in their decisions, with the decided weight of authority holding that
the giving of a chattel mortgage on a stock of goods for a bona fide
debt, whether it be a lien or title given as security, does not constitute a
sale, transfer or assignment in violation of the Act. Although special
grounds for reaching the same result have been found by some courts,
the most common basis for such a holding is that the words, "sale, trans-
